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Abstract
The base of the company’s growth has changed, from tangible assets to intangible
assets. Many companies recognize the importance of IC as performance drivers.
This research aimed to examine the effect of the implementation of digital banking,
corporate governance, family ownership, foreign ownership, and government own-
ership on Intellectual Capital (IC) performance; and examined the effect of interac-
tions between corporate governance and ownership structure on IC performance in
banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2012-
2016. This research used a regression method with panel data. The total observa-
tions were 130 cases. In this research, IC performance used Value Added Intellec-
tual Coefficient (VAIC). We proved that the implementation of digital banking did
no significant implications for IC performance in the same year because it was still
in the process of developing. Family ownership, foreign ownership, government
ownership, and the interaction between corporate governance and ownership struc-
ture did not affect IC performance. On the contrary, this research proved that corpo-
rate governance had significant implications for improving IC performance.
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Digital Banking; Intellectual Capital Per-
formance; Ownership Structure
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Abstrak
Basis pertumbuhan perusahaan telah berubah, dari aset berwujud menjadi aset tidak berwujud.
Banyak perusahaan mengakui pentingnya IC sebagai driver kinerja.Penelitian ini bertujuan
untuk menguji pengaruh penerapan perbankan digital, tata kelola perusahaan, kepemilikan
keluarga, kepemilikan asing dan kepemilikan pemerintah terhadap kinerja Intellectual
Capital (IC) dan menguji pengaruh interaksi antara tata kelola perusahaan dan struktur
kepemilikan terhadap kinerja IC pada perusahaan perbankan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek
Indonesia (BEI) selama 2012-2016. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode regresi dengan
data panel. Total pengamatan adalah 130 kasus. Dalam penelitian ini, kinerja IC
menggunakan Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (VAIC). Kami membuktikan bahwa
penerapan perbankan digital tidak berimplikasi signifikan terhadap IC performance pada
tahun yang sama karena masih dalam proses berkembang. Kepemilikan keluarga, kepemilikan
asing, kepemilikan pemerintah, dan interaksi antara tata kelola dan struktur kepemilikan
tidak berpengaruh terhadap IC performance. Sebaliknya, penelitian ini membuktikan bahwa
tata kelola perbankan berimplikasi signifikan dalam meningkatkan IC performance.
Kata Kunci: Tata Kelola; Perbankan Digital; Kinerja Modal Intelektual; Struktur
Kepemilikan
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The development of the modern era caused a change
in economic development (Osinski et al., 2017). The
change of industrial economics marks the change in
economic development into knowledge-based eco-
nomics, an economic development that prioritizes
knowledge capital in its activities (Schiavone et al.,
2014). The most advanced economic growth in the
recent year is knowledge-based economics
(Dzenopoljac et al., 2017). Knowledge becomes an
important element of economic resources and a
source of competitive advantage (Usoff, Thibodeau,
& Burnaby, 2002; Hamdan, 2018).
Along with these changes, the base of the com-
panies growth also changes, from tangible assets to
intangible assets (Osinski et al., 2017; Rochmadhona,
Suganda, & Cahyadi, 2018). Al-Musali & Ismail (2016)
argue that the emergence of a knowledge-based
economy basically driven by intangible assets has
increased interest in Intellectual Capital (IC). Ac-
cording to the Chartered Institute of Management
Accountants (2000), IC is the possession of knowl-
edge and experience, professional knowledge and
skills, good relationships, and technological capac-
ity, which can provide a competitive advantage for
the company. Thus, IC is the most important intan-
gible asset for companies in creating value, replac-
ing machinery and natural resources (Daryaee et al.,
2011).
Today, many companies recognize the impor-
tance of IC as performance drivers (Marr &
Moustaghfir, 2005; Ozkan, Cakan, & Kayacan, 2017).
In the new economic era, IC serves as knowledge-
related resources, representing the wealth of ideas,
capabilities, infrastructure, and relationships that are
the most important factors for business success in
creating value and sustaining a company’s competi-
tive advantage (El-Bannany, 2012; Al-Musali &
Ismail, 2016; Kehelwalatenna, 2016; Khairiyansyah
& Vebtasvili, 2018). In many instances, IC is impor-
tant for decision making within the company and
external interests (Alhassan & Asare, 2016).
In recent years, the banking industry is fac-
ing a competitive environment (Mondal & Ghosh,
2012; Alhassan & Asare, 2016). Cross-border com-
petition is forcing the banking industry to achieve
sustainable financial performance (Mondal & Ghosh,
2012). The banking industry is a knowledge-inten-
sive industry with technological innovation and high
customer interaction (Veltri & Silvestri, 2011). There-
fore, it is important for banks to invest in the devel-
opment of intellectual potential for sustainable com-
petitive advantage (Tiwari & Vidyarthi, 2018).
Although many research states the importance
of IC in the creation of corporate value and requires
appropriate measurement tools, traditional finan-
cial accounting still does not take into account in-
tangible resources that drive corporate value
(Abhayawansa & Guthrie, 2016). Under Interna-
tional Accounting Standards (IAS 38), most intan-
gible assets cannot be identified unless the assets
protected by certain laws (e.g., patents and trade-
marks) are recognized when purchased (Forte et al.,
2017).
In the literature, many researchers have con-
ducted research on the factors affecting IC perfor-
mance (Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan, 2009; Al-Musalli
& Ismail, 2012; Wahid et al., 2013; Greco,
Ferramosca, & Allegrini, 2014; Makki & Loddhi,
2014; Shahveisi, Khairollahi, & Alipour, 2016;
Supradnya, Ulupui, & Putri, 2016; Forte et al., 2017).
In summary, these studies examine the effect of cor-
porate governance and ownership structure on IC
performance.
Al-Musalli & Ismail (2012), Wahid et al. (2013),
and Makki & Loddhi (2014) conducted research re-
lated to the effect of corporate governance on IC
performance. Wahid et al. (2013) and Makki &
Loddhi (2014), prove that corporate governance
positively affects IC performance. However, Al-
Musalli & Ismail (2012) prove that corporate gover-
nance negatively affects IC performance.
Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan (2009), Al-Musalli
& Ismail (2012), Greco, Ferramosca, & Allegrini
(2014), Forte et al. (2017) conducted research related
to the effect of family ownership on IC performance.
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Greco, Ferramosca, & Allegrini (2014) and Forte et
al. (2017) prove that family ownership positively
affects IC performance. However, Saleh, Rahman,
& Hassan (2009) and Al-Musalli & Ismail (2012)
prove that family ownership negatively affects IC
performance.
Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan (2009), Al-Musalli
& Ismail (2012), and Supradnya, Ulupui, & Putri
(2016) researched the effect of foreign ownership
on IC performance. Supradnya, Ulupui, & Putri
(2016) proved that foreign ownership positively af-
fects IC performance. However, Saleh, Rahman, &
Hassan (2009) and Al-Musalli & Ismail (2012) prove
that foreign ownership does not affect IC perfor-
mance.
Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan (2009), Al-Musalli
& Ismail (2012), and Shahveisi, Khairollahi, & Alipour
(2016), researched the effect of government owner-
ship on IC performance. Shahveisi, Khairollahi, &
Alipour (2016) prove that government ownership
negatively affects IC performance. Saleh, Rahman,
& Hassan (2009) and Al-Musalli & Ismail (2012)
prove that government ownership does not affect
IC performance.
Previous studies have proved inconsistent
results. Therefore, researchers are interested in ex-
amining the effect of corporate governance and
ownership structures on IC performance. This re-
search will examine the effect of corporate gover-
nance and ownership structure on IC performance
in Indonesian banking with some differences from
previous research. This research has differences with
previous research in the following ways: (1) there
is an additional variable for the implementation of
digital banking in Indonesia. This is because, in the
digital era like today, the banking industry relies
on digital banking in attracting customers so that
digital banking becomes the key to achieving com-
petitive advantage (Mbama & Ezepue, 2018). In ad-
dition, only a few previous research that examines
digital banking; (2) the measurement of corporate
governance in this research uses an index, while
previous research (Al-Musalli & Ismail, 2012; Makki
& Loddhi, 2014) measures separately as board size,
number of independent commissioners, and num-
ber of audit committee meetings.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Over the past few years the growth of infor-
mation and communication technology in the glo-
bal banking industry is accelerating (Sharma et al.,
2017). The banking industry implements technology
to achieve competitive advantage through a larger
customer base and personalized banking services
for reduced operational costs (Sharma, Govindaluri,
& Al Balushi, 2015; Laukkanen, 2016). Consistent
with resources-based theory, the company’s re-
sources can be a key driver in the performance and
competitiveness of enterprises (Riahi-Belkaoui,
2003). Acharya, Kagan, & Lingam (2008) researched
the implementation of online banking, with a sample
of bank communities in the US. The results of this
research prove that the increase in online banking
positively affects financial performance. Al-Smadi
& Al-Webel (2011) researched with a sample of 15
Jordanian banks during the period 2000-2010. The
result proves that e-banking negatively affects bank
performance. This can happen because bank custom-
ers in Jordan prefer to transact traditionally than e-
banking.
Based on the perspective of resources based
theory and existing research (Acharya, Kagan, &
Lingam, 2008), the researchers expect the higher the
implementation of digital banking; the company will
be more efficient to increase the IC performance.
Therefore, this research formulates the first hypoth-
esis as follows:
H1: the implementation of digital banking posi-
tively affects IC performance
Shleifer & Vishny (1997) mentioned that cor-
porate governance is a concept based on agency
theory in the hope of being a tool to convince inves-
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tors that they will get a return on their investment.
Weak corporate governance can lead to an inability
to create and maintain IC (Wahid et al., 2013). This
is because corporate governance has the responsi-
bility to formulate strategic plans, engage in impor-
tant decisions, monitor management and be respon-
sible for IC investments (Keenan & Aggestam, 2001).
Wahid et al. (2013) and Makki & Loddhi (2014) prove
that corporate governance positively affects IC per-
formance. However, Al-Musalli & Ismail’s (2012)
research with a sample of 74 banks registered on
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) proved that
corporate governance negatively affects IC perfor-
mance. Corporate governance in the research of Al-
Musalli & Ismail (2012) was measured by the size of
the board and the presence of independent direc-
tors.
Based on agency theory and previous research
(Wahid et al., 2013; Makki & Loddhi, 2014), the re-
searchers expect the higher the implementation of
corporate governance; the IC performance can in-
crease. Thus, this research formulates the second
hypothesis as follows:
H2: corporate governance positively affects IC per-
formance
Arifin & Rachmawati (2006) state that the most
dominant ownership structure in Indonesia is fam-
ily owned. Claessens, Djankov, & Lang (2000) also
state that families own around 67 percent of com-
panies in Indonesia. If viewed from the agency
theory, the conflict of interest between management
and owners is increasing when the family owner-
ship of the company becomes smaller. This is be-
cause company management will usually try to maxi-
mize their personal interests rather than the inter-
ests of the company (Andres, 2008). However, the
presence of high family ownership can cause en-
trenchment effects, namely acts of abuse of power
that can harm minority shareholders (Fan & Wong,
2002). Higher family ownership makes family wealth
tied to the wealth of the company so that manage-
ment who is also the owner always tries to reduce
all risks of losing their wealth (Pukthuanthong et
al., 2013). Family ownership can cause a reduction
in long-term investment, which will reduce IC per-
formance (Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan, 2009). Greco,
Ferramosca, & Allegrini (2014) and Forte et al. (2017)
prove that family ownership positively affects IC
performance. However, Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan
(2009) and Al-Musalli & Ismail (2012) prove that fam-
ily ownership negatively affects IC performance.
Based on theoretical studies and previous re-
search (Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan, 2009; Al-Musalli
& Ismail, 2012), the researchers expect that the higher
the family ownership, the IC performance will de-
crease. Therefore, this research formulates the third
hypothesis as follows:
H3: family ownership negatively affects IC per-
formance
Over the past few years, many Asian devel-
oping countries have opened the banking system to
foreign competition (Gopalan & Rajan, 2010). Fur-
ther, Gopalan & Rajan (2010) argue that the level of
foreign ownership in Indonesia has increased dra-
matically compared to Thailand and the Philippines.
Gulamhussen & Guerreiro (2009) mentioned that
with the presence of foreign ownership can improve
monitoring and can influence management to be able
to adopt better technology. Companies with foreign
ownership change their strategy with new perspec-
tives and ideas to improve company performance
(Polovina & Peasnell, 2015). Consistent with insti-
tutional theory, when there is an ambiguous goal
or inadequate understanding of information tech-
nology, companies will imitate foreigners or are
called mimetic pressure (March & Olsen, 1976).
Kamardin, Bakar, & Ishak (2017) examine foreign
ownership on Intellectual Capital Disclosure (ICD).
The result proves that foreign ownership positively
affects ICD. Khlif, Ahmed, & Souissi (2017) analyzed
69 empirical studies; the result proves that foreign
ownership positively affects voluntary disclosure.
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Supradnya, Ulupui, & Putri (2016) researched with
a sample of 49 companies listed on the IDX. The
results prove that the foreign ownership positively
affects IC performance. However, Saleh, Rahman,
& Hassan (2009) and Al-Musalli & Ismail (2012)
prove that foreign ownership does not affect IC
performance. The main reason is Saleh, Rahman, &
Hassan (2009) used a sample of companies listed on
the stock exchange less than ten years so that for-
eign ownership does not affect IC performance.
Based on theoretical studies and previous re-
search by Supradnya, Ulupui, & Putri (2016),
Kamardin, Bakar, & Ishak (2017), and Khlif, Ahmed,
& Souissi (2017), the researchers expect that the
higher the foreign ownership, the IC performance
will increase. Thus, this research formulates the
fourth hypothesis as follows:
H4: foreign ownership positively affects IC per-
formance
Based on agency theory, if the agent and prin-
cipal are different parties, it has the potential to cause
agency conflict (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In gov-
ernment ownership, the government as the share-
holder becomes the principal party and the man-
agement of the company becomes the agent. Com-
panies with high government ownership cause cor-
porate activities to be aligned with government in-
terests (Hunardy & Tarigan, 2017). This implies an
alignment effect, which indicates that management’s
actions must be in line with the interests of the ma-
jority shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2002).
Sabrina & Muharam (2013) prove that gov-
ernment ownership positively affects banking finan-
cial performance. In Indonesia, banks with high
government ownership will be under the supervi-
sion of the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises and
the Financial Services Authority. Therefore, banks
with high government ownership can focus on in-
creasing performance. However, Shahveisi,
Khairollahi, & Alipour (2016) prove that government
ownership negatively affects IC performance. High
government ownership causes the potential for po-
litical intervention so that investment decisions only
aim for the short term (Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan,
2009). In contrast, Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan (2009)
and Al-Musalli & Ismail (2012) prove that govern-
ment ownership does not affect IC performance.
Based on theoretical studies and previous re-
search by Sabrina & Muharam (2013), the research-
ers expect that the higher the government owner-
ship, the IC performance will increase. Therefore,
this study formulates the fifth hypothesis as follows:
H5: government ownership positively affects IC
performance.
The ownership structure can be a controlling
aspect in corporate governance mechanisms (Perrini,
Rossi, & Rovetta, 2008; Connelly et al., 2010; Saputra
& Wardhani, 2017). One way to limit opportunistic
management actions in agency theory is to apply
corporate governance that serves as a tool to en-
sure that directors and management act best for the
company’s interests (Watts, 2006). Azila-Gbettor et
al. (2018) argue that corporate governance consists
of structure and process. Furthermore, Azila-
Gbettor et al. (2018) explain that ownership and
board are Corporate Governance Structures (CGS).
CGS aims to set discipline the behavior of corpo-
rate governance actors, such as directors and ex-
ecutive managers. Corporate Governance Processes
(CGP) refer to the interaction of governance actors
based on governance structures (Sarbah & Xiao, 2015
in Azila-Gbettor et al., 2018).
Family owners can control the company in
various ways. One way is through family board
members. Family board members can influence de-
cision making by expressing opinions on board meet-
ings (Sakawa & Watanabel, 2018). Companies with
family ownership may face problems. First, family
ownership can be a source of entrenchment, which
can reduce corporate value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
Secondly, the increase in family ownership will
cause their wealth to be tied to the wealth of the
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company so that the management who is also the
owner of the company always tries to reduce the
risk of losing its wealth (Pukthuanthong et al., 2013).
Consequently, family ownership causes a reduction
in the long-term investment that will reduce IC per-
formance (Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan, 2009).
In terms of foreign ownership, Tunay & Yüksel
(2017) argue that there is relevancy between corpo-
rate governance and foreign ownership. Tunay &
Yüksel (2017) explained that foreign banks could
improve corporate governance in the countries
which they operate. Min & Bowman (2015) prove
that an increase in foreign ownership can improve
corporate governance systems. Foreign ownership
can improve monitoring and may influence manage-
ment to adopt better technology (Gulamhussen &
Guerreiro, 2009). Polovina & Peasnell (2015) also
argue that companies with foreign ownership can
change their strategy by bringing new perspectives
and ideas to improve corporate performance. Based
on the explanation above, then this research formu-
late hypotheses as follows:
H6: family ownership weakens the effect of cor-
porate governance on IC performance.
H7: foreign ownership strengthens the effect of
corporate governance on IC performance
METHODS
This research is hypothesis testing research.
In this research, data came from the company’s an-
nual report for the period 2012-2016 which was
downloaded through www.idx.com. In addition,
data were also obtained from various online sources
on the internet related to the research variables. This
research uses a regression method with panel data.
Panel data is data that consists of time series data
and cross-section (Gujarati, 2009).
The population used in this research were all
banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange from 2012-2016. This research chooses a
sample using a purposive sampling technique, tak-
ing samples in accordance with the sample require-
ments with criteria as follows: (1) banking compa-
nies must have positive VA; (2) excluding sharia
banking, because corporate governance in Islamic
banking is different from conventional banking.
The total listed banking companies are 43 com-
panies, but the sample companies are 26 companies.
The total observations used in this research were
130 cases. The summary of research samples based
on sampling criteria are presented in Table 1.
This research uses Microsoft Excel and Eviews
9 in the data processing process. The reasons un-
derlying the selection of Eviews software because
Eviews can choose the best test method between
Pool Least Square (Common Effect), Fixed Effect
and Random Effect.
This research aims to: (1) examine the effect
of the implementation of digital banking (DB), cor-
porate governance (CG), family ownership (FAM-
ILY), foreign ownership (FOREIGN), and govern-
ment ownership (GOV) on IC performance (VAIC);
and (2) examine the effect of interaction between
corporate governance and ownership structure on
the IC performance. Control variables used were
firm age (AGE), firm size (SIZE), and leverage (LEV).
This research model using the model as follows:
  Description Total 
Banking companies are listed on the IDX 43 
Companies outside the observation period (not sampling criteria) 
Banking companies that have a negative VA (not sampling criteria) 
(11) 
 (5) 
Sharia Banking (not sampling criteria) (1) 
The company used as the research sample 26 
 
Table 1. The Summary of Research Samples Based on Sampling Criteria
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In this research, the measurement of IC per-
formance using VAIC (Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan,
2009; Al-Musalli & Ismail, 2012; El-Bannany, 2012;
Greco, Ferramosca, & Allegrini, 2014; Makki &
Loddhi, 2014; Shahveisi, Khairollahi, & Alipour,
2016; Kamardin, Bakar, & Ishak, 2017). VAIC rep-
resents the level of efficiency in value creation. This
research uses VAIC as a measure of IC performance
because the required data is available in the audited
financial statements of the company so that it is more
objective and verifiable (Pulic, 2000). Pulic (2004)
simplifies the calculation of the total VA using the
information contained in the annual report as follows:
VA = OP + EC + D + A (2)
Description:
OP = operating profits
EC = total employee cost
D = depreciation
A = amortization
Calculation of Human Capital Efficiency
(HCE):
(3)
Description:
Human Capital (HC) = employee expenses
include salaries and benefits
Calculation of Structural Capital (SC):
SC = VA – HC (4)
Calculation of Structural Capital Efficiency
(SCE)
(5)
Calculation of Capital Employed Efficiency (CEE)
(6)
Description:
Capital Employed (CE) = available funds (eq-
uity and net income)
Calculation of Value Added Intellectual
Coeficient (VAIC™)
VAIC™ = HCE + SCE + CEE     (7)
The implementation of digital banking in this
research was measured using an index from Cisco
Consulting (Bradley et al., 2014). The reason for
using the index from Cisco Consulting because the
index represents various digital banking channels.
In addition, there is no digital banking index used
in Indonesia, and it is expected the index from Cisco
can represent the implementation of digital bank-
ing in Indonesia. The index consists of 21 items in-
clude dial-up experience, email contact center, online
brochureware, databases, customer relation man-
agement, web-based account origination, online cal-
culators and bill pay, click to chat & call, data ware-
house, know your customer, seamless experience,
full-function smartphone apps, internal & hybrid
cloud, click-to-video, big data & analytics, 360 cus-
tomer views, digital banks, digital branches, rich
cross-channel collaboration & advice, Omnichannel
analytics, market one customer-centricity, and
Intercloud. The company gets a score of 1 if it has
implemented the item in the index and the company
will get a value of 0 if it has not used the items in
the index. Then, summed of the scores and divided
 
VAIC = α + ߚ1DB + ߚ2CG + ߚ3FAMILY + 
ߚ4FOREIGN+ ߚ5GOV + ߚ6CG x FAMILY + ߚ7CG x FOREIGN + ߚ8AGE + ߚ9SIZE + 
ߚ10LEV + ߝ                 (1) 
 
HCE = 
ܸܣ
ܪܥ
 
SCE = 
ܵܥ
ܸܣ
 
CEE = 
ܸܣ
ܥܧ
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by 21 items to obtain the final score for the imple-
mentation of digital banking.
The measurement of corporate governance in
this research uses an index from Hermawan (2011).
This research choose the index from Hermawan
(2011) because this index is more appropriate when
applied in Indonesia, even many researchers have
used this index in Indonesia (Muhammadi, 2016;
Herusetya, 2017; Prayogo & Agoes, 2017). This in-
dex reflects the effectiveness of the board of com-
missioners and audit committee which includes in-
dependence, activity, number of members, and com-
petence — the assessment of the index divided into
three categories. Good get 3 scores, fair gets 2 scores,
and bad or no information gets 1 score. The score is
then summed to get the final score for corporate
governance.
The measurement of family ownership in this
research is measured by the percentage of share
ownership owned by the family (Villalonga & Amit,
2006; Al-Musalli & Ismail, 2012).
The measurement of foreign ownership in this
research is measured by the percentage of share
ownership owned by the foreign (Saleh, Rahman,
& Hassan, 2009; Kamardin, Bakar, & Ishak, 2017).
The measurement of government ownership
in this research is measured by the percentage of
share ownership owned by the government (Saleh,
Rahman, & Hassan, 2009; Al-Musalli & Ismail, 2012).
The measurement of age in this research uses
the natural log (ln) of the length of the company
Variables Operational Definition 
IC Performance Using VAIC from Pulic (2004) 
The Implementation of Digital Banking Using index adapted from Cisco Consulting (Bradley et al., 2014)  
Corporate Governance Using index from Hermawan (2011)  
Family Ownership Percentage of share ownership owned by the family 
Foreign Ownership Percentage of share ownership owned by the foreign 
Government Ownership Percentage of share ownership owned by the government 
Age  Natural log (ln)of the length of the company established 
Size Natural log of total assets  
Leverage Debt to equity ratio, calculated by dividing total liabilities by total equity 
of the company 
 
Table 2. Operational Definition Variables
established (Forte et al., 2017). El-Bannany (2012)
states that age is a proxy for a company’s success.
Usually, older companies achieve better perfor-
mance than younger ones.
In this research, size will be calculated by the
natural log (ln) of total assets at the end of the year
(Al-Musalli & Ismail, 2012; El-Bannany, 2012; Greco,
Ferramosca, & Allegrini, 2014; Shahveisi, Khairollahi,
& Alipour, 2016). The facilities to larger companies
can help to achieve a competitive advantage than
smaller ones (El-Bannany, 2012).
The measurement of leverage using debt to
equity ratio, calculated by dividing total liabilities
by total equity of the company (Saleh, Rahman, &
Hassan, 2009; Kamardin, Bakar, & Ishak, 2017).
Keenan & Aggestam (2001) argue that stakeholders
increase fiduciary responsibility to monitor IC in-
vestment. Companies can be forced to manage their
IC more actively.
RESULTS
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on each
variable in this research. Based on the results of
descriptive statistics, the mean value of VAIC is
3.112, while the standard deviation is 0.807. The
maximum VAIC is 4.799 owned by Bank Central
Asia (BBCA) in 2013. The minimum VAIC is -0.387
owned by Bank MNC International (BABP) in 2014.
The mean value of the implementation of digi-
tal banking (DB) is 0.492, while the standard devia-
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tion is 0.123. The maximum DB is 0.810 owned by
BBCA in 2016. The minimum DB is 0.286 owned by
BABP in 2012-2015, Bank Capital Indonesia (BACA)
in 2012-2016, Bank Nusantara Parahyangan (BBNP)
in 2012-2014, Bank J Trust Indonesia (BCIC) in 2012-
2014, Bank Pembangunan Daerah Banten (BEKS) in
2012-2013, Bank Victoria International (BVIC) in
2012-2015, Bank Artha Graha International (INPC)
in 2012, Bank Mayapada International (MAYA) in
2012-2013, and Bank China Construction (MCOR)
in 2012-2013.
The mean value of corporate governance (CG)
is 78.546, while the standard deviation is 3.093. The
maximum CG is 84.000 owned by Bank Rakyat In-
donesia (BBRI) in 2015-2016, Bank Jabar Banten
(BJBR) in 2016, Bank Mandiri (BMRI) in 2012 and
2014, Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional (BTPN)
in 2016. The minimum CG is 71.000 owned by BBNP
in 2016.
The mean value of the family ownership (FAM-
ILY) is 24.061, while the standard deviation is 28.262.
The maximum FAMILY is 90.900 owned by Bank
Bumi Arta (BNBA). The minimum FAMILY is 0.000
owned by Bank Rakyat Indonesia Agro Niaga
(AGRO), Bank Bukopin (BBKP) in 2012, Bank
Negara Indonesia (BBNI), BBRI, Bank Tabungan
Negara (BBTN), Bank Danamon Indonesia
(BDMN), BJBR, Bank Pembangunan Daerah Jawa
Timur (BJTM), BMRI, Bank CIMB Niaga (BNGA),
Maybank Indonesia (BNII), BTPN, and Bank OCBC
NISP (NISP).
The mean value of foreign ownership (FOR-
EIGN) is 35.850, while the standard deviation is
32.981. The maximum FOREIGN is 98.383 owned
by BNII in 2012. The minimum FOREIGN is 0,000
owned by AGRO in 2012, BBCA in 2012, BBKP,
BNBA in 2012-2015, Bank Sinar Mas (BSIM) in 2013-
2015, Bank Artha Graha International (INPC) in
2015, MCOR in 2012-2015, and Bank Mega (MEGA).
The mean value of government ownership
(GOV) is 17.705, while the standard deviation is
28.687. The maximum GOV is 80.000 owned by BJTM
in 2012-2015. The minimum GOV is 0.000 owned by
BABP, BACA, BBCA in 2012-2014, BBNP, BDMN,
BNBA, BNGA, BNII, BSIM, BTPN, BVIC, INPC,
MAYA, MCOR, MEGA, NISP, Bank Pan Indonesia
(PNBN), and Bank Woori Saudara Indonesia
(SDRA).
The Chow test and The Hausman test prove
that the fixed effect model is the best model that
can be used in this research. Based on the results of
the F test, all models have a significance of 0.000.
Because the significance level is less than 0.05 (5
percent), then all models can be used to predict the
dependent variable, IC performance. Table 4 pre-
sents the results of the regression model 1. Table 4
presents the research model in 3 parts, model A,
model B, and model C. Model A is a research model
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VAIC 0.387 4.799 3.112 0.807 
DB 0.286 0.810 0.492 0.123 
CG 71.000 84.000 78.546 3.093 
FAMILY 0.000 90.900 24.061 28.962 
FOREIGN 0.000 98.383 35.850 32.981 
GOV 0.000 80.000 17.705 28.687 
AGE 2.634 4.796 3.784 0.484 
SIZE 15.063 20.761 17.850 1.533 
LEV 3.208 13.244 7.350 2.216 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Notes: DB: implementation of digital banking; CG: corporate governance; FAMILY: family ownership; FOREIGN: foreign ownership; GOV: government
ownership; AGE: company age; SIZE: corporate size; LEV: leverage
Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan | BANKING
Volume 22, Issue 4, October 2018: 715–734
| 724 |
without control variables. Model B is a research
model with control variables. Model C is a model
for moderating variables. The purpose of present-
ing the three models is to present the changes in
each addition of variables (control and moderation).
Based on the results of regression, the sig-
nificance value of DB is 0.7358, while the coefficient
value is 0.2711. The significance value of DB is greater
than the significance level of 5 percent. Thus, the
implementation of digital banking in Indonesia has
no significant effect on IC performance, which
means data do not support the first hypothesis of
this research.
The results of the regression prove that the
CG significance value is 0.0008, while the coefficient
value is 0.0654. The significance value of CG is
smaller than the significance level of 5 percent. This
means that corporate governance positively affects
IC performance. Thus, the second hypothesis of this
research is supported by data.
The results of regression prove that the FAM-
ILY significance value is 0.4995, while the coefficient
value is 0.0040. The significance value of FAMILY is
greater than the significance level of 5 percent. Thus,
family ownership has no significant effect on IC
performance, which means that data do not sup-
port the third hypothesis of this research.
The results of regression prove that the FOR-
EIGN significance value is 0.8386, while the coeffi-
cient value is -0.0009. The significance value of FOR-
EIGN is greater than the significance level of 5 per-
cent. Thus, foreign ownership has no significant ef-
fect on IC performance, which means that data do
not support the fourth hypothesis of this research.
The results of regression prove that the GOV
significance value is 0.9944, while the coefficient
 
Variables 
 
Exp. 
Sign 
Fixed Effect Model 
A B C 
Coeff Prob Coeff Prob Coeff Prob 
Independent        
DB + -2.0183 0.0059 -0.1390 0.8653 -0.0664 0.9365 
CG + 0.0636 0.0036 0.0497 0.0140 -0.0083 0.8354 
FAMILY - 0.0002 0.9691 0.0032 0.6002 0.0820 0.1636 
FOREIGN + 0.0005 0.9079 -0.0018 0.6968 -0.0673 0.1666 
GOV + 0.0057 0.8655 -0.0028 0.9282 -0.0055 0.8603 
Control        
AGE    -7.0099 0.0000 -7.4794 0.0000 
SIZE    0.5247 0.0462 0.5887 0.0424 
LEV    -0.0263 0.3479 -0.0277 0.3200 
Moderating        
CG*FAMILY Weaken     0.0011 0.1438 
CG*FOREIGN Strengthen     0.0008 0.1730 
     
R-squared  0.804302 
0.745000 
13.56274 
0.000000 
0.840463 
0.785622 
15.32547 
0.000000 
0.845100 
0.787425 
14.65267 
0.000000 
Adjusted R2  
F-statistic  
Prob(F-statistic)  
 
Table 4. Model 1
Notes: DB: implementation of digital banking; CG: corporate governance; FAMILY: family ownership; FOREIGN: foreign ownership; GOV: government
ownership; AGE: company age; SIZE: corporate size; LEV: leverage
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value is -0.0002. The significance value of GOV is
greater than the significance level of 5 percent. Thus,
government ownership has no significant effect on
IC performance, which means that data do not sup-
port the fifth hypothesis of this research.
The results of regression prove that the
CG*FAMILY significance value is 0.7814, while the
coefficient value is 0.0002. The significance value of
CG*FAMILY is greater than the significance level
of 5 percent. Thus, the interaction between corpo-
rate governance and family ownership has no sig-
nificant effect on IC performance, which means that
data do not support the sixth hypothesis of this re-
search.
The results of regression prove that the
CG*FOREIGN significance value is 0.1680, while the
coefficient value is 0.0008. The significance value of
CG*FOREIGN is greater than the significance level
of 5 percent. Thus, the interaction between corpo-
rate governance and foreign ownership has no sig-
nificant effect on IC performance, which means that
data do not support the seventh hypothesis of this
research.
DISCUSSION
The Implementation of Digital Banking on IC
Performance
The regression results in model A (without
control variables) prove that the implementation of
digital banking negatively affects IC performance.
However, the regression results in model B (with
control variables) prove that the implementation of
digital banking does not affect IC performance. Re-
searchers suspect that the difference in regression
results is due to the presence of control variables in
model B. Especially because age and size have a sig-
nificant effect on IC performance. Thus, the control
variable plays an important role in influencing IC
performance.
The regression results in model B (the main
model for the implementation of the digital bank-
ing in this research) prove that the implementation
of digital banking does not affect IC performance,
so data do not support the first hypothesis. The re-
sults of this research not consistent with Acharya,
Kagan, & Lingam (2008) which proves that the imple-
mentation of online banking positively affects US
banking financial performance. The results of this
research is also inconsistent with Al-Smadi & Al-
Webel (2011) which proves that e-banking negatively
affects Jordanian banking performance.
The results of this research different from ex-
isting research because the implementation of digital
banking in Indonesia is not optimal (the average of
the implementation of digital banking in Indonesia
during 2012-2016 is 0.492 or equivalent with digital
banking 2.0) and still in the process of developing.
Figure 1 presents the average of the implementation
of digital banking in Indonesia from 2012-2016.
 
 
Figure 1. The Average of the Implementation of Digital Banking Figure 1. The Average of the Implementation
of Digital Banking
Thus, researchers suspect that the implemen-
tation of digital banking in Indonesia still requires
time to influence IC performance positively. Digital
banking is a long journey, so it takes time to adjust
with digital strategies, it takes time to overcome
digital distractions (such as unstable internet con-
nections) and takes time to improve bank features
to suit the needs of customers (Deloitte tax & con-
sulting, 2017). Based on these allegations, research-
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ers argue that research on the implementation of
digital banking would be better if using a different
year with the dependent variable (year +1 or +2 from
the year of the dependent variable). This is because
the implementation variable takes time to prove its
positive effects.
Corporate Governance on IC Performance
The regression results in model B prove that
corporate governance positively affects IC perfor-
mance, so data support the second hypothesis of
this research. The results of this research not con-
sistent with the research of Al-Musalli & Ismail
(2012) which proves that corporate governance
negatively affects IC performance. However, the
results of this research consistent with Wahid et al.
(2013) and Makki & Loddhi (2014), which proves
that corporate governance positively affects IC per-
formance.
This implies that corporate governance in the
banking industry plays an important role in improv-
ing IC performance. The important role of corpo-
rate governance in the banking industry is supported
by the existence of the Financial Services Authority,
an independent institution whose job was to regu-
late, supervise, inspect and investigate banking busi-
ness activities. The existence of the Financial Ser-
vices Authority can minimize the occurrence of ir-
regularities in corporate governance practices.
Family Ownership on IC Performance
The regression results in model B prove that
family ownership does not affect IC performance
so data do not support the third hypothesis. The
results of this research not consistent with Greco,
Ferramosca, & Allegrini (2014) and Forte et al. (2017)
prove that family ownership positively affects IC
performance. The results of this research also in-
consistent with Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan (2009) and
Al-Musalli & Ismail (2012) which prove that family
ownership negatively affects IC performance.
The results of this research prove different
from existing research. The researchers suspect this
because the average of family ownership in Indo-
nesia during 2012-2016 was 24.06. This means that
the average of family ownership does not reach a
quarter of total banking ownership in Indonesia.
This implies that banking companies listed on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange, on average, comply with
the rules on the maximum shareholding limits for
each category of shareholders. This regulation is
contained in Peraturan Bank Indonesia number 14/8/
PBI/2012 and Peraturan Otoritas Jasa Keuangan num-
ber 56/POJK. 03/2016.
Foreign Ownership on IC Performance
The regression results in model B prove that
foreign ownership does not affect IC performance,
so data do not support the fourth hypothesis. The
results of this research not consistent with
Supradnya, Ulupui, & Putri (2016), Kamardin, Bakar,
& Ishak, (2017), and Khlif, Ahmed, & Souissi (2017),
which proves the positive influence of foreign own-
ership. However, this research consistent with Saleh,
Rahman, & Hassan (2009) and Al-Musalli & Ismail
(2012) which prove that foreign ownership does not
affect IC performance.
This is because the average foreign sharehold-
ers of the Indonesian banking sector come from Asia,
so the transfer of knowledge and technology is not
significant in Indonesia, which also includes the
Asian region. In addition, the possibility of foreign
investors prefers to maintain short-term relation-
ships that focus on profit rather than long-term re-
lationships (Al-Musalli & Ismail, 2012).
Government Ownership on IC Performance
The regression results in model B prove that
government ownership does not affect IC perfor-
mance, so data do not support the fifth hypothesis.
The results of this research not consistent with
Sabrina & Muharam (2013) which proves the exist-
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ence of a positive influence from government own-
ership. The results of this research is also inconsis-
tent with Shahveisi, Khairollahi, & Alipour (2016)
which proves that government ownership negatively
affects IC performance. However, the results of this
research consistent with Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan
(2009) and Al-Musalli & Ismail (2012) which prove
that government ownership does not affect IC per-
formance.
This can happen one of them because not all
banks have a percentage of government ownership.
This research has 26 banking samples, but only eight
banks have a percentage of government ownership.
Another reason, companies with government own-
ership also have other goals such as social and politi-
cal rather than maximizing profits (Shen & Lin, 2009).
The Interaction between Corporate
Governance and Ownership Structure on IC
Performance
The regression results in model C prove that
the interaction between corporate governance and
family ownership does not affect IC performance,
so data do not support the sixth hypothesis. The
researchers suspect that this is because the fit and
proper test rules for board members caused only
competent people to be placed in that position. This
regulation is contained in the Financial Services
Authority Regulation number 55/POJK.03/2016
about implementation of corporate governance for
commercial banks. Therefore, family owners do not
place their representatives on board members. The
results of this research are consistent with
Muawanah (2014), who argues that regulation and
supervision eliminate family influence in the gover-
nance process. This implies that regulation and su-
pervision are urgent for companies with family
ownership to encourage practice towards good gov-
ernance (Muawanah, 2014).
The regression results in model C also prove
that the interaction between corporate governance
and foreign ownership does not affect IC perfor-
mance so data do not support the seventh hypoth-
esis. Unfortunately, researchers have not found
publications or literature about the interaction of
corporate governance and foreign ownership. How-
ever, the researchers suspect that the non-influen-
tial interaction between corporate governance and
foreign ownership has the same reason as the non-
influential interaction between corporate governance
and family ownership. The researchers suspect that
this is because the fit and proper test rules for board
members caused only competent people to be placed
in that position. This regulation is contained in the
Financial Services Authority Regulation number 55/
POJK.03/2016 about implementation of corporate
governance for commercial banks. Therefore, for-
eign owners do not place their representatives on
board members.
Control Variables (Age, Size, Leverage) on IC
Performance
In the case of control variables, the regres-
sion results prove that the age of the company nega-
tively affects IC performance. Loderer, Stulz, &
Waelchli (2016) argue that young companies invest
more in research and development.
Regression results prove that firm size posi-
tively affects IC performance. El-Bannany (2012)
argues that the facilities available to large compa-
nies can help companies to achieve competitive ad-
vantage.
The regression results prove that leverage
does not affect IC performance. Researchers suspect
this can occur because of the use of leverage inap-
propriate in the banking environment. Measurement
of leverage in this research is total bank liabilities
divided by total equity. Third-Party funds that a
measure of bank success also included in the total
liability component. As a result, a high leverage ra-
tio cannot indicate bank difficulties.
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Robustness Test
Robustness test is used to ensure the strength
of the findings in the main model. The study was
repeated using different measurements of digital
banking and ownership structures. In the first
model, researchers measured digital banking imple-
mentation in Indonesia to stage 4.0. Because the
average of the implementation of digital banking in
Indonesia is 0.492 (equivalent to digital banking 2.0),
the second model is repeated by measuring digital
banking implementation until stage 2.0. Table 5 pre-
sents the results of the second model robustness test.
The results in model 2B prove consistent with
model 1B. The result proves that corporate gover-
nance positively affects IC performance. In contrast,
digital banking implementation, family ownership,
foreign ownership, and government ownership do
not affect IC performance. This indicates that the
measurement of digital banking up to stage 2.0 or
up to stage 4.0 consistently proves that the imple-
mentation of digital banking has no effects on IC
performance.
Furthermore, this research was repeated us-
ing different ownership structure measurements. In
the first model, the measurement of family and for-
eign ownership uses the percentage of family and
foreign shareholdings. In the third model, the mea-
surement of family and foreign ownership uses the
nominal method. The company gets a score of 1 if
there is a family member or foreign party on the
board of commissioners. Instead, the company gets
a value of 0 if there is no family member or foreign
party on the board of commissioners. Table 6 pre-
sents the results of the third model robustness test.
The results in model 3B prove consistent with
model 1B. The results in model 3B prove that cor-
porate governance positively affects IC performance.
The implementation of digital banking, family own-
ership, foreign ownership, and government own-
ership do not affect IC performance. This indicates
that the measurement of ownership structure using
the percentage of ownership or using the existence
of the board consistently proves that family owner-
ship and foreign ownership do not affect IC perfor-
mance.
 
Variables 
 
Exp. 
Sign 
Fixed Effect Model 
A B C 
Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. 
Independent        
DB + -1.0112 0.1517 -0.1958 0.8441 -0.2635 0.8021 
CG + 0.0736 0.0012 0.0534 0.0163 0.0331 0.4591 
FAMILY - -0.0011 0.8434 -0.0001 0.9856 -0.0449 0.4914 
FOREIGN + -0.0005 0.9024 0.0013 0.7982 -0.0058 0.9150 
GOV + 0.0042 0.5286 -0.0067 0.8456 -0.0072 0.8352 
Control        
AGE    -5.8867 0.0026 -6.1512 0.0023 
SIZE    0.1467 0.6284 0.2101 0.5101 
LEV    0.0036 0.9047 0.0027 0.9297 
Moderating        
CG*FAMILY Weaken     0.0005 0.4914 
CG*FOREIGN Strengthen     0.0009 0.8897 
     
R-squared  0.112718 
0.076941 
3.150532 
0.010336 
0.820854 
0.759272 
13.32956 
0.000000 
0.821822 
0.755479 
12.38751 
0.000000 
Adjusted R2  
F-statistic  
Prob(F-statistic)  
 
Table 5. Model 2
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Variables 
 
Exp. 
Sign 
Fixed Effect Model 
A B C 
Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. 
Independent        
DB + -2.0153 0.0050 -0.2839 0.7295 -0.1355 0.8721 
CG + 0.0643 0.0024 0.0515 0.0095 0.0507 0.0341 
FAMILY - -0.2644 0.1732 -0.2461 0.1736 3.3023 0.4326 
FOREIGN + 0.3081 0.2442 0.1141 0.6538 -1.9705 0.5784 
GOV + 0.0058 0.8627 -0.0033 0.9136 -0.0041 0.8959 
Control        
AGE    -6.1534 0.0001 -6.0952 0.0002 
SIZE    0.4236 0.0123 0.3357 0.2312 
LEV    -0.0159 0.5323 -0.0225 0.3940 
Moderating        
CG*FAMILY Weaken     -0.0459 0.3983 
CG*FOREIGN Strengthen     0.0270 0.5541 
     
R-squared  0.810638 
0.753256 
14.12695 
0.000000 
0.841693 
0.787275 
15.46717 
0.000000 
0.843547 
0.785293 
14.48053 
0.000000 
Adjusted R2  
F-statistic  
Prob(F-statistic)  
 
Table 6. Model 3
Notes: DB: implementation of digital banking; CG: corporate governance; FAMILY: family ownership; FOREIGN: foreign ownership; GOV: government
ownership; AGE: company age; SIZE: corporate size; LEV: leverage
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
Conclusion
The results of this research prove that the
implementation of digital banking does not affect
IC performance in the same year. Researchers sus-
pect that the implementation of digital banking still
requires time to have a positive effect on IC perfor-
mance. The results of this research prove that cor-
porate governance positively affects IC performance.
This implies that corporate governance in Indone-
sian banking has proven to play an important role
in improving IC performance. The results of statis-
tical tests prove that family ownership and foreign
ownership do not affect IC performance. Strict regu-
lations cause family and foreign shareholders in In-
donesia do not place their representatives in the
company. This is also the cause of the non-influence
of the interaction between corporate governance
and ownership structure on IC performance. The
results of this research prove that government own-
ership does not affect IC performance. This can hap-
pen one of them because companies with govern-
ment ownership also have other goals such as social
and political rather than maximizing profits.
Suggestions
This research has several limitations that must
be considered in interpreting the results of this re-
search. The limitations of this research are as fol-
lows: (1) this research uses the VAIC method to
measure IC performance. The data needed comes
from the company’s financial statements without
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considering non-monetary aspects; (2) the way to
fill in the indexes in this research conducted by re-
searchers alone so it cannot be separated from sub-
jectivity; (3) measurement of family ownership and
foreign ownership in this research only uses the per-
centage of share ownership and the existence of the
board without considering aspects of cultural back-
ground or purpose of ownership; and(4) the lever-
age variable as a control variable calculated by di-
viding total liabilities and total equity. The total li-
ability component includes third-party funds that
measure the success rate of the bank.
Based on these limitations, suggestions that
can be given for further research as follows: (1) fu-
ture research can use methods other than VAIC so
that it can be used as a comparison with the VAIC
method. For example, non-monetary methods such
as Vital Sign Scorecard (VanderKaay, 2000) or the
Ernst & Young Model (Barsky & Marchant, 2000);
(2) the way to fill the index in the next research is
done by confirming more than one person. Even if
possible can involve experts in filling in these in-
dexes; (3) further research can measure the owner-
ship structure other than the percentage of share
ownership and the existence of the board, for ex-
ample by considering aspects of cultural background
and purpose of ownership; and (4) control variables
in subsequent research in the banking industry can
use variables other than leverage — for example,
the variable Loan Deposit Ratio (LDR) which shows
the amount of credit given with funds received by
the bank.
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